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SUPREME COURT WATCH: UPCOMING CRIMINAL
CASES ON THE 2006-2007 DOCKET
CLB Staff*
Docket:  05-0595
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Questions Presented:
1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the
Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington,
regarding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay evidence
under the 6th Amendment, applies retroactively to cases on col-
lateral review? 
2. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Crawford
applies retroactively to cases on collateral review violates the
ruling in Teague v. Lane?
3. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 28
U.S.C. sec. 2254(d)(1) and (2) adopted the Teague exceptions
for private conduct which is beyond criminal prosecution and
watershed rules?
Facts:
In Bockting’s trial for the rape of his stepdaughter, the
judge declared the six year-old girl unavailable as a witness and
allowed prosecutors to introduce the testimony of both the
investigating detective and the child’s mother regarding state-
ments made by the child, despite the presence of hearsay evi-
dence.  Bockting had no opportunity at any point during the trial
to cross-examine the six-year old complaining witness.
Ultimately, the trial court convicted Bockting of rape, and sen-
tenced him to life in prison.  The Nevada courts denied his
appeals and the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada
denied his petition for habeas corpus.  The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, basing its decision on Crawford v.
Washington.  The Crawford rule, which is aimed at upholding
the Confrontation Clause, states that hearsay evidence is admis-
sible only if (1) the witness is unavailable and (2) the defendant
has had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness prior to
trial.  Applying Crawford to Bockting’s case, he was entitled to
a new trial; however, because Crawford was issued after
Bockting’s trial, the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether the
Crawford rule could be applied retroactively. 
In order for a rule to be applied retroactively, it must
first be considered a “new rule.”  The Ninth Circuit Court found
that Crawford deviated enough from the precedent in Teague v.
Lane, which previously governed hearsay evidence, to consider
it a “new rule.”  Second, the court determined that the new rule
fell into one of two categories of exceptions to non-retroactivi-
ty—“a bedrock rule of criminal procedure”—making it retroac-
tive.  The Ninth Circuit Court subsequently determined that the
Nevada Supreme Court, by failing to apply Crawford and dis-
missing Bockting’s habeas claim, violated the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).  The Ninth
Circuit Court’s opinion is contrary to other federal appeals
courts that have concluded that Crawford is not retroactive.
Docket:  05-9222
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Questions Presented:
1. Is the holding in Blakely v. Washington a new rule or
was it dictated by Apprendi v. New Jersey?
2. If Blakely is a new rule, does its requirement that facts
resulting in an enhanced statutory maximum be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt apply retroactively?
Facts:
Lonnie Lee Burton was convicted of raping a 15-year
old boy in 1991, and sentenced to almost 47 years in prison for
rape, robbery, and burglary.  Burton’s sentence was approxi-
mately 21 years longer than the sentencing guidelines suggested
and was to run consecutively instead of concurrently.  Burton
claimed that the judge should not have been allowed the discre-
tion to increase his sentence.  A decade after Burton’s convic-
tion, the U.S. Supreme court ruled in Blakely v. Washington that
any factors increasing a sentence beyond a determined sentenc-
ing guideline must be found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
effectively limiting judicial discretion on sentencing.  Burton
filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that Blakely should be
applied to his case.  Burton also argued that his sentence violat-
ed Apprendi v. New Jersey which held that factors increasing the
sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt to a jury.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Blakely is
a new rule that cannot be applied retroactively.  The Court also
held that, although Apprendi did apply to this case, Burton’s sen-
tence did not violate Apprendi because the sentence imposed did
not exceed the statutory maximum—life imprisonment.
Docket No. 05-0493 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Questions Presented: 
1. Does Boyde v. California confirm the constitutional
sufficiency of California’s “unadorned factor (k)” instruction
when a defendant presents mitigating evidence of his back-
ground and character which relates to, or has a bearing on, his
future prospects as a life prisoner?
2. Does the Ninth Circuit’s holding, that California’s
“unadorned factor (k)” instruction is constitutionally inadequate
to inform jurors they may consider “forward-looking” mitiga-
tion evidence constitute a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane?
Facts: 
Belmontes was charged with first-degree murder, and
subsequently convicted by a jury.  During the trial’s penalty
phase, prosecutors brought up his violent past, including prior
criminal charges.  Defense lawyers introduced witnesses who
told jurors of Belmontes’ impoverished and abusive life, and
that he adjusted to prison life and embraced Christianity during
a prior incarceration.  During jury instructions, the trial court
Wharton v. Bockting Burton v. Waddington
Ornoski v. Belmontes
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judge told jurors to consider several factors in deciding whether
or not Belmontes would receive life imprisonment or the death
penalty including, his prior convictions, age, and “any other cir-
cumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”  The last instruc-
tion is known as the “unadorned factor (k).”  Jurors sentenced
Belmontes to death.
In Boyde, the Court upheld factor (k) and rules that it
didn’t prevent jurors from taking into account a defendant’s pre-
crime background and behavior in determining death sentences.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Belmontes death
sentence and stated that the jury instructions given in the trial
court confused jurors by leading them to consider his violent
past and crimes instead of his probable future as a model prison-
er.  Two years later, in Brown v. Payton, the Supreme Court
again upheld “factor (k)” ruling that it did not preclude jurors
from taking into account a defendant’s post-crime behavior.  The
Court vacated the 9th Circuit’s judgment and ordered it to recon-
sider the case in light of the Payton decision.  The Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed its decision, based on the “factor (k)” instruction.
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Payton did not apply because
Belmontes’ federal appeals predated the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which curtails the ability
of federal courts to hear death penalty appeals stemming from
state courts.
Docket No. 05-8820
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Questions Presented:
1. Whether the one-year statute of limitations period of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act denies habeas
relief?
2. Does the confusion around the statute of limitations–as
evidenced by the split in the circuits–constitute an “extraordi-
nary circumstance,” entitling a defendant to equitable tolling
during the time when his claim is being considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court on certiorari?
Facts:
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) after the Oklahoma City
bombing to fund anti-terrorism efforts and to limit the appeals
process open to death-row inmates.  AEDPA bars federal courts
from considering any petition for habeas corpus unless the state
court has “unreasonably” interpreted some portion of the consti-
tution in finding the prisoner guilty.  The Act has a one-year
statute of limitations for habeas appeals in federal court.
Lawrence was convicted of first-degree murder and the jury rec-
ommended the death penalty.  The sentence was affirmed by the
Florida Supreme Court.  After unsuccessfully appealing his sen-
tence twice, Lawrence sought habeas relief in federal court.
Lawyers for the state argued that his claim should be dismissed
because he had already exceeded the time limit on both his orig-
inal and amended petition based on AEDPA.  The district court
held that Lawrence’s petition was invalidated by exceeding the
allotted time, but he was issued a certificate of appealability.
Lawrence appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit stated that the district court was
wrong to grant Lawrence a certificate of appealability, but
acknowledged a disparity among the federal circuits in how the
time limit for habeas appeals is applied.
Docket Number: 05-0785 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
1. Did the appearance of the deceased’s family in court
with large photographic buttons of the deceased violate the con-
stitutional rights of the defendant in a murder trial in which the
defendant claimed self-defense?
Facts:
Matthew Musladin shot and killed one of two men who
approached him during the course of his argument with his
estranged wife.  The two men lived with the woman and
approached Musladin carrying a gun and a machete, respective-
ly.  The family members of Tom Studer, the man killed by
Musladin, attended the trial wearing buttons with his image.
Musladin was convicted and his conviction was upheld in feder-
al district court.  It was overturned in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the state appealed.  Musladin relied on earlier rul-
ings holding that spectators for a trial wearing buttons proclaim-
ing “women against rape” were prejudicial to a jury as they
assumed the defendant’s guilt, as well as cases that held that
requiring that a prisoner appeared shackled and in prison garb
could also prejudice the outcome of a trial.
Docket Number 05-6551
California Court of Appeals, First Appellate District
Question Presented:
1. Whether a judge is allowed to consider facts not deter-
mined by the jury or admitted by the defendant, as allowed by
the California Determinate Sentencing Law, or whether this law
is unconstitutional?
Facts:
When sentencing John Cunningham for a conviction of
child sexual abuse, the judge made an upward departure from
the sentencing guidelines based on facts that were not found by
the jury to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.  Under California
law, these aggravating factors were allowed to contribute to the
judge’s sentencing determination.  The defendant challenged his
sentence under the 6th and 14th Amendments, alleging that the
California statute violated his right to a jury trial and his right to
due process of law.  The state court of appeals upheld the sen-
tence, and the defendant appealed, citing the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301
(2004), which held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub-




* The general staff and members of the Executive Board con-
tributed to the compilation of material presented in this sec-
tion.  Extremely helpful to this compilation was Northwestern’s
Medill School of Journalism’s U.S. Supreme Court News sec-
tion, “On The Docket,” which can be found at
http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu.
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